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I

will now briefly and schematically present my understanding of the existing
state ofthe relevant law, then quickly summarize the developments since the
Gulf War - the immediate trigger of most of the current interest in this subject
- and finally indicate where, on the basis of the foregoing, the present law appears
to be in need of strengthening or other improvement.
First, a schematic summary of the current state of the law -which, incidentally,
has not changed significantly since the Gulf War.

A. Norms governing armed conflict:
(1) Those prohibiting wanton destruction, which go back to the 1899 and 1907
Hague Peace Conferences, are embodied in treaties that have been widely
acceptedl and have been held to be solidly part of customary law that binds even
those States that are not parties to these agreements. They do not specifically refer
to the environment but, when observed, largely do protect it and actually
proscribed most of the environmental abuses committed in the course of the Gulf
War.2
(2) Other, more recent humanitarian treaties,3 and some others such as the
ENMOD Convention,4 specifically require the protection of the environment.
However, many significant States have not yet become parties to these treaties,
and their recent vintage and the scarcity ofrelevant State practice makes it difficult
to consider them part of customary internationallaw.5
B. Environmental protection norms:
(1) Treaties relating to or containing general provisions for environmental
protection, such as the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,6 the many
International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions regulating the disposal
of oil in the sea,7 or similar regional conventions such as those relating specifically
to the Persian Gulf,8 which generally do not specify whether and to what extent
they are meant to apply to or during military conflicts.9
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(2) There are some environmental instruments that specifically refer to military
operations, such as the following provisions of the 1982 World Charter for
Nature: IO
5. Nature shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile
activities.
20. Military activities damaging to nature shall be avoided.

and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: 11
Principle 24
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore
respect intemationallaw providing for protection of the environment in times of
armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.

The General Assembly also stressed, in a post-Gulf War resolution on
"Protection of the environment in times of armed conflict", in which it referred
to applicable provisions of the 1907 Hague and 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977
Additional Protocol I, the ENMOD Convention, and the Rio Declaration, that:
destruction of the environment, not justified by military necessity and carried out
wantonly, is clearly contrary to existing intemationallaw....12

Though these statements, which are merely declarations of leading
representative international bodies, basically at best constitute international 'soft
law,' their adoption by the votes or with the concurrence of representatives of a
large majority of countries lend some weight to the suggestion that they represent,
if not yet well-established customary law, at least the shape of lege ferenda. 13
This quick summary suggests that the current shape of the international law
protecting the environment during armed conflict is not really in very good shape,
with principal reliance still placed on nearly century-old principles of
humanitarian law evolved when environmental protection was not yet even a
glimmer in the consciousness of the international community.
When legal stocktaking after the GuifWar I4 revealed the somewhat tattered
nature of this twig of international law, there was at first a good deal of scurrying
around to see what should be done. Greenpeace and others suggested the
formulation of a Fifth Geneva Convention on the Protection of the Environment
in Time of Armed Conflict, and there were corresponding suggestions for the
establishment of an International Green Cross. IS Fairly soon the matter was taken
up by both the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) - presumably
concerned to protect its position as the world's primary humanitarian law
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organization - and the U.N. General Assembly, which was pleased to defer in this
complicated and ticklish field to the ICRC. I6
The Red Cross thereupon held a number of expert meetings, and after
submitting an interim report to the United Nations in 199211 superseded the latter
by an excellent definitive one the following year. IS In it, the ICRC in effect rejected
the formulation of any comprehensive new international instrument and
suggested instead a number of more modest measures, such as: clarifying the
relationship between the somewhat similar terminology in the ENMOD
Convention and in Article 35(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions; review of the applicability in armed conflict ofinternational
environmental law; restriction on the use of mines; protection of cultural sites and
nature reserves and parks; institutional means of implementing provisions on the
protection of the environment in times of armed conflict; dissemination of the
relevant international legal provisions; and the drafting of Guidelines for military
manuals and instruction -for whi~h purpose it attached a detailed text. I9 The
General Assembly generally endorsed this approach and in particular the proposed
Guidelines. 20
Having personally been among those who initially considered that it might be
best to recodify and expand the existing international law,21 I must confess that I
now concede the force of the arguments against such a project. My principal reason
is that stated yesterday by Mr. Conrad Harper, that because of the need to achieve
widespread consensus on any new treaty, "the resulting agreement might likely
resemble a lowest common denominator, decidedly unhelpful in dealing with hard
cases" and that it might "be a model of ambiguity." It would appear that
governments are not at present ready to accept significant new obligations in this
field, and any attempt to press them to do so might indeed be counter-productive.
In this connection, I would like to recall my experience as the Legal Adviser to
the 1979-1980 U.N. Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious
or to have Indiscriminate Effects, which produced the 1980 Convention of the
same name and the three initial Protocols thereto. 22 There I observed to what
extent the military members of, or advisers to, national delegations almost
uniformly took the most conservative stance, opposing any restrictions that could
conceivably in the future inhibit their own countries' actions, even if the proposed
restrictions - ifobserved - would be ofgreat protective value to their own troops,
and the grounds for wishing to remain unrestrained were at best speCUlative. There
is no reason to expect that the situation would be different at any conference
convened to draft environmental restrictions on warfare.
This having been said, I would now like to list a number of proposals-some,
but not all, already mentioned in the 1993 ICRC report-for improving the current
state of the relevant law. I will divide these suggestions into those pertaining to
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the actual conflict (on which most of our discussions so far appear to have focused),
those relating to the pre-conflict and those to the post-conflict phases - while
recognizing that, of course, no strict division is possible.

1. With respect to the conflict or combat phase:
(a) Encouragement of universal adherence to existing treaties, in particular, the
1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
(b) Attempts to clarify existing norms, and in particular the terms
"wide-spread," "long-Iastingllong-term" and "severe," which appear disjunctively
in the ENMOD Convention and conjuctively in Additional Protocol I and which
are discussed in the travaux preparatoires of the respective instruments23 - from
which it appears that no reconciliation of the unfortunately similar terminology
of these two instruments is possible.
(c) Clarification of the status of environmental treaties during armed conflict:
(i) between the parties to such conflict; and (ii) between such parties and neutrals.
In this connection, it is necessary to examine both the question of the persistence
of treaty obligations during a state of war between parties thereto,24 and the
perhaps more fundamental question of whether such treaties are meant to apply,
fully or partially, during a state ofwarfare.25 In this connection, it may be apposite
to note that multilateral environmental treaties generally establish erga omnes
obligations, which two or more parties cannot suspend (except with effect purely
between themselves) even by agreement - so why should they be able to do so by
engaging in armed conflict with each other.
(d) Effective dissemination of the applicable rules to all whose actions or
decisions might violate them, which can probably be best done by means of
military manuals such as foreseen in the Guidelines proposed by the ICRC.
(e) The establishment of an international monitoring organ to function during
periods of armed conflict, to note, if possible to investigate, and to remind the
parties concerned of their obligations in respect of environmental protection; such
functions might, but need not necessarily, be assigned to the International
Fact-Finding Commission established pursuant to Article 90 of the 1977
Additional Protocol 1.26
2. With respect to the pre-conflict phase:
(a) Attention should be paid to the U.N. General Assembly's 1980 resolution
on the "Historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present
and future generations," in which the Assembly, inter alia:
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2. [Drew] the attention of States to the fact that the continuing arms race has
pernicious effects on the environment ....
There is little doubt that military exercises, in particular extensive target
practice, are destructive of the environment where they take place. Moreover,
weapons production facilities, such as nuclear facilities in the United States, may
for various reasons not be subject to as strict environmental controls as other
industrial enterprises. Much could probably be done to alleviate these situations
- though obviously a reduction of war preparations would be most beneficial.
(b) Attention should also be paid to Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, which
reads as follows:
Article 36 - New weapons
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of new weapons, means or
method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine
whether its employment would, in some or in all circumstances, be prohibited
by this Protocol or by any other rule ofinternationallaw applicable to the High
Contracting Party.
First of all, it should be noted that this obligation thus encompasses the
environmentally protective provisions of Articles 35(3), 55 and 56 of the Protocol,
but also refers to all other such provisions of conventional or customary law,
whatever their source. 27 Second, the methods of determining whether a particular
new weapon might be unduly offensive to the environment include the by now
well-established practices of environmental impact assessments 28 and the use of
the precautionary principle29 - which evidently can not easily be applied in
combat situations but which should be fully applicable in pre-conflict ones.
(c) The setting of targeting rules and the selection of targets or types of targets
should, as far as possible, be carried out in advance of a particular armed conflict
and, in any event, of a particular combat situation, at a level of leadership whether military or civilian - where account can appropriately be taken of any
relevant environmental considerations. Thus, it should not be left to commanders
of ships to decide whether or not, under certain circumstances (e.g., the
maintenance of an embargo), tankers maybe targeted.
3. With respect to the post-conflict phase:
(a) Some type of international, impartial fact-finding procedure should be
established to determine to what extent and how the environment has been harmed
during an armed conflict, and all parties to the conflict should be required to
co-operate in such an exercise.
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(b) Procedures should be established for the determination and assessment of
civil liability on States for the infliction, during a conflict, of undue damage to the
environment, which damages should be payable to the States damaged or to the
international community if the damage extends to a res communis. Such liability
need not necessarily be restricted to the aggressor State, though such a State might
be required to bear the ultimate burden of any environmental harm caused, as the
Security Council required oflraq in the GulfWar.30 But as between a neutral in
a conflict (or the international community) and a participant in a conflict who
caused improper environmental harm (i.e., harm inconsistent with a legal
obligation of such State), it would seem proper that the latter rather than the
former bear the burden - though that is not the current view of the International
Law Commission.31
(c) Procedures should be established for the determination of criminal liability
for individuals and possibly even for States. For the former, the necessary
institutions could be based on the examples of the ad hoc tribunals that the Security
Council has established in respect offormer-Yugoslavia32 and Rwanda,33 but a
more sound foundation would probably be the International Criminal Court now
under consideration by the General Assembly.34
As to what constitutes environmental crimes, it should first of all be noted that
Article 85(5) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I specifies that grave breaches of that
instrument or of the 1949 Conventions constitute war crimes; however, it does not
identify breaches of its environmental provisions (Articles 35(3) and 55) as grave
breaches- although "extensive destruction . . . of property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly" is so classified by
Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV and is thus a war crime for parties to the
Protocol. In addition, the I.L.C. had included in its first reading of the Draft Code
of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the "employing of methods
and means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause wide-spread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment" as an "exceptionally
serious war crime.,,35
Furthermore, under its work on "State Responsibility," the I.L.C. has
tentatively classified as a State crime "massive pollution of the atmosphere or of
the seas,,36 - though the very notion of the criminal responsibility of States has
recently been seriously questioned in the Commission. 37
(d) Finally, one of the most useful post-conflict environmental measures that
could be taken would be to make effective provisions for the removal of the
remnants of war, and especially mines, from erstwhile battlefields. In this
connection, one might recall a 1982 U.N. General Assembly resolution on
"Remnants ofWar,,38 that stated, inter alia:
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Convinced that the responsibility for the removal of the remnants of war should be
borne by the countries that planted them,
3. Reiterates its support of the just demands of the States affected by the implantation
of mines and the presence of the remnants of war on their lands for compensation
from the States responsible for those remnants....

Though there has been no direct foIIow-up of that somewhat isolated
declaration, it should be noted that immediately after the Gulf War cease-fire the
Security Council demanded that Iraq:
Provide all information and assistance in identifying Iraqi mines, booby traps and
other explosives as well as any chemical and biological weapons and material in
Kuwait, in areas of Iraq where forces of Member States cooperating with Kuwait
pursuant to Resolution 678 (1990) are present temporarily, and in adjacent
waters .....39
Such an obligation, ofcourse, is set out in Protocol II (which deals with land mines)
of the Inhumane Conventional Weapons Convention. 40
Of greater general and long-term significance is the conference that the United
Nations organized this July on the Removal of Land Mines, recognizing that this
may be the most important post-war environmental restoration that can be taken.
On the other hand, the first Review Conference of the Inhumane Weapons
Convention, which is inter alia scheduled to consider an extension of Protocol II
to that instrument, is unlikely to make much progress over the existing provisions
- for the majority of poorer countries consider simple contact mines to be a
weapon of choice for those that cannot afford more complex and expensive
defensive devices, such as the self-destructing mines that would meet the
requirements of the existing Protocol.
Arguably, the present Symposium has-true to a narrow construction of its
title-so far focused too extensively on the protection of the environment during
actual combat, i.e., in situations where these concerns can least readily be
accommodated, and thus arouse the greatest anxiety of the military. By contrast,
the measures that can be taken before a particular conflict arises, and in any event
before an actual combat operation has begun, and especially those that can be taken
after the end of the conflict, appear to have been somewhat neglected even though
they may well be less controversial and more effective.

Notes
*Formerly the Principal Legal Officer with the United Nations.
I. See, in particular, the "Martens Clause" set out in the Preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2227; T.S. 539; Bevans 631, Articles 22, 23(g) and 55 of the Hague
Regulations attached thereto, as well as Article 53 ofl949 Geneva Convention IV on Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516; T.I.A.S. 3365; 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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2. It is evidently these rules that are referred to in para. 3 of the "Chairman's Conclusions" of the July 1991
Ottawa Conference of Experts on the Use of the Environment as a Tool of Conventional Warfare [hereinafter the
Ottawa Conference Conclusions], which declares that: "There was a shared view that important provisions of
customary and conventional law had heen seriously violated."
3. In particular, 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 16
J.L.M. 1391 (1977), Anicles 35(3) and 55 of which are directly relevant.
4. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Uses of Environmental Modification
Techniques, 18 May 1977, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151; 31 U.S.T. 333; T.I.A.S. 9614; 16 I.LM. 88 (1977).
5. It is therefore less clear on what evidence the Chairman of the Ottawa Conference (see supra n. 2) based his
conclusions in paragraphs 5 and 9, respectively that: "There was a shared view that wanton destruction of the
environment with no legitimate military objective is clearly contrary to existing international law" and "The
customary laws ofwar, in reflecting the dictates ofpublic conscience, now include a requirement to avoid unnecessary
damage to the environment." See also the texIS preceding n. 13 infra.
'
6.21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982), in particular Pan XII (Articles 192-237), Protection and Preservation of the Marine
Environment.
7. In particular: the International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 12 May 1954,
327 U.N.T.S. 3; 12 U.S.T. 2989; T.I.A.S. 4900; Brussels International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, 29 November 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970); London Convention on Civil Liability for Oil
Pollution Damage from Offshore Operations, 1 May 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1450 (1977).
8. Kuwait Protocol [to the Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution, 24 April 1978] concerning Regional Co-operation in Combatting Pollution by Oil and
Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency, 24 April 1978, 17 I.L.M. 526 (1978).
9. Article 236 of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (supra n. 6), misleadingly titled "Sovereign
immunity," makes Chapter XII of the Convention inapplicable to any naval or other governmental ships, which
suggests that at least these provisions do not apply in armed conflict
10. U.N. General Assembly Res. 37n of28 Oct. 1982, 22 I.L.M. 455 (1982), adopted bya voteof1l1: 1 (United
States): 18.
11. U.N. Doc. NCONF.151126 (Vol. I), part 1.1.1; 31 I.L.M. 876 (1992).
12. U.N. General Assembly Res. 47/37 of25 Nov. 1992, 5th preambularparagraph, U.N. Doc. NRES/47/37 (1993).
13. It is presumably on declarations of this type that the Ottawa Conference Conclusions referred to in n. 5 supra
were based-though it should be noted that the latter two were subsequent to both the Gulf War and the Ottawa
Conference.
14. Aside from the July 1991 Ottawa Conference of Experts referred to in n. 2 supra, the International Council of
Environmental Law held consultations in December 1991 in Munich that issued a Final Rcpon; these and other
meetings, some that merely surveyed the terrain and others that considered specific further action, are listed in the
JCRC repon cited in n. 20 infra, endnote 4, p. 22. In addition, there were two reports to the U.S. Congress, respectively
by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Gulf Pollution Task Force, on "The Environmental
Aftermath of the Gulf War", March 4 and 5,1992, the Executive Summary and Rccommendations of which contains
a section on "International Legal Issues", and by the Depanment of Defense on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War,
Appendix 0 of which addressed "The Role of the Law of War" and includes a brief section on "Environmental
Terrorism" (31 I.L.M. 612, at 636-37 (1992».
15. See, The Globe and Mail, 6 and 11 March 1991, respectively reporting on and presenting the proposals of
Patrick Boyer, a Canadian Member ofParliamenL
16. See, U.N. General Assembly Decision 46/417 of9 December 1991, on the agenda item: "Exploitation of
the environment as a weapon in times of armed conflict and the taking of practical measures to prevent such
exploitation".
17. U.N. Doc. N47/328, 31 July 1992.
18. U.N. Doc. N481269, 29 July 1993, part II.
19. Id., section H.G (paras. 109-13) and Annex. It might be noted that these conclusions, including the one
concerning military manuals, were foreshadowed by the Ottawa Conference Conclusions two years earlier.
20. U.N. General Assembly Res. 48/30 of9 December 1993, paras. 11-14; see also Resolution 49/50 of9 December
1994, paras. 11-12.
21. See Szasz, Environmental Destructicn as a Method of Warfare: International Law Applicable 10 the Gu/fWar, 15:2
Disarmament 128 (1992), "Some Proposals" at lSI, as well as the other carIier studies referred to in n. 6 to that article.
22. 1342 U.N.T.S. 7; 19 I.L.M. 1529 (1980).
23. Understandings concerning the terms used in ENMOD were recorded by the U.N.'s Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament, A/31127, Annex I, reproduced in the article in Disarmament (supra n. 24), in endnote
II at 155-56. With rcspectto Additional ProtocolI, the terms in question and their comparison with those in ENMOD
are discussed in the Rapponeur's Repon, O.R. XV, p. 268, CDDH/215/Rev.I, para. 27, reproduced with extensive
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comments in CoMMENTARY ONnIE ADDmoNAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TOniE GENEVA CoNVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST
1949 (Sandoz, Swinarski, & Zimmermann eds. 1987) paras. 1454-58, at 416-19.
24. This question is so difficult that it was explicitly evaded by Article 73 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (1155 U.N.T.S. 331); however, it is interesting to note that Article 75 suggests that there may be
special obligations in respect of a treaty for an "aggressor State."
25. It should be noted that the International Council of Environmental Law, in its 1991 Final Report (see supra
n. 14) "6••.. drew attention to the fact that the rules of international environmental law continue to apply between
parties to an armed conflict and third parties [and] recommended clarification of the extent to which these rules also
continue to apply between parties to an armed conflict."
26. The Commission was established only a few years ago, when 20 parties to the Protocol had made the declaration
required by Anicle 90(2); it has not as yet had any business. It should be noted that it is likely that the Commission
will consist mostly of expens in conventional humanitarian law, and that in any event its competence is limited, in
respect of environmental protection strictu sensu, to the relevant provisions of Additional Protocol I.
27. See ICRC report, supra n. 18, para. 36.
28. See Principle 17 ofthe Rio Declaration,supra n.ll. More imponantly, the requirement to make environmental
impact assessments (originally a U.S. domestic innovation) has been enshrined in numerous international
instruments, including treaties (see, e.g., those listed in Weiss, Szasz & Magraw, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:
BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND REFERENCES (1992) at 120-21).
29. Rio Principle 15 (UI.) and the instruments set out in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (id.) at 121.
30. Security Council Res. 687 (1991) of3 March 1991, para. 16. See also Article 75 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties supra n. 24.
31. Under the heading "International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts not Prohibited by
International Law" the I.L.C. Rapporteur has suggested the adoption of the following draft Anicles:
Anicle24
Harm to the environment and resulting harm to persons or property
If the transboundaty harm proves detrimental to the environment of the affected State:
(a) The State oforigin shall bear the costs ofany reasonable operation to restore, as far as possible, the conditions that
existed prior to the occurrence of the harm. If it is impossible to restore these conditions in full, agreement may be
reached on compensation, monetary or otherwise, by the State of origin for the deterioration suffered.••.
Anicle26

Exceptions
1. There shall be no liability on the part of the State of origin or the operator, as the case may be:
(a) If the harm was directly due to an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection ...
(Report of the I.L.C. on its 42nd session, 45 GAOR Suppl. No. 10 (AJ45/10), ch. VII, paras. 515-16, at 274-77. In his
report to the 43rd (1991) session of the Commission, the Rapporteur proposed some restructuring of the provisions
quoted below, but without any substantive changes (AJCN.4/437, paras. 59 and 61).)
However, under the heading of "State Responsibility", the Commission is considering the inclusion-apparently
without a military exception-of:
•.. a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and preservation of the
human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas.
(Report of the I.L.C. on its 28th session, 31 GAOR Suppl. No. 10 (AJ31110), ch. III.B.!, para. 78, at 175, reproduced in
1976:II I.L.C.Y.B. 95-96).
32. U.N. Security Council Res. 827 (1993) of25 May 1993.
33. U.N. Security Council Res. 955 (1994) of11 Aug. 1994.
34. U.N. General Assembly Res. 49/53 of9 Dec. 1994. For the latest text of the Draft Statute of such a tribunal,
see the I.L.C. report set out in U.N. Document N49/1O.
35. Report of the I.L.C. on its 43rd session, 46 GAOR Suppl. No. 10 (AJ46/lO), Ch. !V.D.!, reproduced in 30 I.L.M.
1584 (1991), draft Anicles 22(2Xd) and 26. It should be noted that the latter Anicle has aroused sufficient opposition
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among governments that the I.L.C. Rapporteur in his latest report (NCN.4/466 and ICorr.l) suggested the deletion
of this provision-a matter that the Commission considered at its 47th session and which it then referred to a special
working group. See 50 GAOR Suppl. No. 10 (N50/l0), ch. II, paras. 38, 119·21, 140-41.
36. Report ofthe I.L.C. on its 28th session,31 GAORSuppl. No. 10 (A!31110), Ch. III.B.l,para. 78, at 175,Teproduced
in 1976:II I.L.C.Y.B. 95·96.
37. See 50 GAOR Suppl. No. 10 (N50/10), ch. IV.B.3, paras. 323-36.
38. U.N. General Assembly Res. 37/215 of20 December 1982.
39. U.N. Security Council Res. 686 of2 March 1991.
40. See fUjJTa n. 22 ..

